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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals misapply this Court's

decision of Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co.

v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293

(1982) in determining the elements necessary to prove intentional
interference with economic relations.

Specifically, did the Court

of Appeals err in concluding that when a defendant is charged with
interferring with another by "improper means" that the defendant's
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good faith belief in such conduct is not relevant in determining
whether the means are "improper", that the violation of any
statute, regulation, or rule of: conduct allows immediate
liability, and that "good faith" is equivalent to a "privilege"?
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals depart from the usual

course of judicial proceedings by misapplying appellate rules.
Specifically, when findings of fact do not include a basis for
special damages and the lower :ourt states to the parties that no
specific basis for the award is required to be given since the
judgment is for general damages only, can an appellate court
affirm the judgment based on its own belief as to what the special
damages should have been even when such belief is negated by
direct findings of the lower court and even though the amount of
damages under such belief is different that than initially awarded
by the lower court?
CITATION OF COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The decision of the Court of Appeals entitled Sampson v.
Richins is found at 102 Utah Adv. Rpts. 53.
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
The decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered February
22, 1989.

An extension of time to file the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari was granted on March 24, 1989 by Justice Howell.
Jurisdiction to review the decision in question by writ of
certiorari is granted pursuant to §78-2-2, U.C.A.
CONTROLLING STATUTES
There are no controlling statutes, ordinances, or
constitutional provisions in this matter.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course
of Proceedings.

The original complaint in this case sought a judgment giving
full faith and credit to a judgment entered in Oregon.

Defendants

filed a counterclaim alleging various defenses to the Oregon
judgment and seeking six affirmative claims for relief on the
counterclaim.

The counterclaim, which is the heart of the present

dispute, alleged that plaintiff John P. Sampson breached a
fiduciary duty as an attorney to the defendants, failed to
exercise reasonable care and skill of an attorney, made slanderous
statements against defendants, intentionally and maliciously
interferred with the defendants' existing and prospective
contracts, and failed to provide an accounting of funds.
Defendants sought compensatory and punitive damages, an
accounting, and injunctive relief.
The case was assigned to retired Judge Bryant Croft who
conducted an eleven-day trial in February of 1986.

In July of

1986 Judge Croft presented the parties with a "Memorandum and
Summation of Evidence" consisting of 177 pages and "Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdict" consisting of 234 pages.
A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdict
is contained as a separate appendix to this Petition because of
its size.

A judgment was entered by the lower court finding in

favor of plaintiff Milton Goff for $19,057 and finding against
plaintiff John Sampson in various amounts totaling approximately
$290,000.
On appeal, this matter was first designated to be heard by
-3-

this Court and accordingly a number of motions were filed by both
parties as to the composition of the record and in attempts to
dismiss Sampson's appeal.

Ultimately, this Court denied all of

Defendants' efforts to dismiss the appeal of Sampson but also
limited the scope of the record to be included to that which was
originally designated by Sampson pro se on June 9, 1987.
During this same period of time a complaint was filed by
defendant Paul Richins against Sampson with the Utah State Bar.
Thirteen separate claims were made by Richins as to Sampson's
conduct.

On June 15, 1987 the screening panel of the Utah State

Bar found Sampson had violated several ethical rules and issued a
private reprimand to plaintiff Sampson finding that a more severe
penalty was unwarranted since in the committee's opinion there was
no dishonesty, deceit or bad rrotive in Sampson's conduct, and that
he was at all times acting in the interest of his limited partner
clients.

On July 15, 1987 all further complaints filed against

Sampson to the Bar Commission were dismissed by bar counsel.
This case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to §78-2-2(4) U.C.A.

A panel of the Court of Appeals,

Judge Judy Billings presiding, affirmed the lower court's
decision as to Sampson's appeal and also affirmed the lower
court's judgment denying punitive damages against Sampson as to
Richins' cross appeal.

It is from this decision as to the

affirmance of the counterclaim that this Writ is now taken.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Because of the voluminous nature of this case and the limited
space available to present this Petition only a cursory
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explanation of the facts which occurred in this case can now be
made.

All facts stated herein are taken directly from the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the lower court.

Citations

are to the page number of the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Verdict", with "F" for Findings portion, "C" for
Conclusions portion, and "V" for Verdict portion.
Defendant Paul Richins undertook to form a number of limited
agricultural partnerships between 1973 through 1980.

(F. 28).

By 1980 these limited partnerships were in dire financial
condition because of numerous problems they were having consisting
of judgments, tax and security problems, and the failure of many
limited partners to pay their assessed shares.

(F. 60-72).

In May of 1980 Sampson was contacted by some of these
investors and asked to attend a meeting of one of the limited
partnerships.

(F.

7 ) . During this meeting Sampson made various

statements concerning the conduct of Richins which he thought was
illegal.

(F.

63).

In subsequent meetings other limited partners

requested Sampson to take necessary steps to relieve Richins as
general partner and to liquidate in an orderly manner.

(F. 64).

In June of 1980 Richins as the general partner of the limited
partnerships executed quit claim deeds to another of his corporate
entities.

(C.

168-69).

He also signed various promissory notes

in an attempt to show a debt owed to the general partner corporate
entities.

(F.

65-66).

In June, Richins sent a letter to some of

the limited partners stating he was withdrawing as general partner
and requesting that they immediately repay any advances he had
made.

(F.

66-67) .
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In the latter part of June a meeting was held at one of these
limited partnership meetings at which time it was discussed that
Sampson and his associates would buy out Richins' interest in the
various partnerships.

(F.

37-38, 68). A weak alliance was

established during the next few months in which Sampson performed
various legal services and assisted Richins in trying to stabilize
the financial affairs of the partnerships.

(F.

39-43).

Both

Sampson and Richins sent letters to the limited partners seeking
approval of the settlement agreement.

(F.

68-69).

By November

it became obvious that an agreement could not be reached since
insufficient numbers of limited partnerships ratified the
compromise.

(Id.) .

In November and January, Richins sent out further notices to
the remaining limited partnerships announcing his withdrawal as
the general partner and requesting return of any monies advanced.
(F.

69).

In December of 1980 Sampson sent out letters to all of

the limited partners requesting that they return to him a signed
power of attorney which would give him the ability to vote their
rights.

(F.

76). Using these powers of attorneys Sampson

undertook to vote the Richins companies out as general partners
and voted in his own professional corporation as the new
substitute general partner.

(F.

76-77).

Later, he was notified

by the bankruptcy court hearing the matter of one of Richins'
companies that his professional corporation could not be a general
partner.

(F.

78). He subsequently incorporated AG Management,

Inc. and attempted to substitute it as the general partner of the
various partnerships.

(F.

7 8 ) . During this same period of time
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Sampson took control of the limited partnerships and received and
disbursed funds.

Sampson kept detailed records of these receipts

and disbursements.

(F. 79).

In October of 1982 Sampson attended an IRS sale and purchased
all of Richins' claims in the various partnerships through his
corporate entities.

(F.

81-82).

Later, in November of 1982 a

Davis County judge ruled that AG Management was not the general
partner of any of the partnerships and that Richins still had
control.

(F.

80-81).

Sampson continued to operate the limited

partnerships based upon his purchase of the IRS tax sale.

(F.

82) .
Subsequently, a Davis County judge on two separate occasions
in December of 1982 and July of 1983 ruled that the IRS sale was
valid and that Sampson had authority to operate as a general
partner.

(F.

82).In May of 1984 a federal district judge entered

an order voiding the IRS tax sale and stating that Sampson had no
interest in the Richins' companies and therefore impliedly could
not be a general partner.

(F.

83). Richins took no action to

vacate the Davis County Judge's order until January of 1985.
83-84) .

(F.

In February of 1985 the state judge vacated his prior

orders which were based on the assumption that the IRS sale was
valid.

(Id.).

The lower court found that from 1980 through October 1984
most of the funds that passed through Sampson's hands were paid
out on partnership expenses and that there was no evidence that
Sampson ended up with the partnership assets.

(F. 86).

The lower court in its Conclusions of Law found that both
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parties had done a number of illegal or improper acts during these
transactions.

As to Sampson, the court concluded that he had

given erroneous legal advice at the various limited partnership
meetings relating to Richins' power as a general partner (C.

166,

170, 189}; Sampson had no legal authority to act on behalf of the
limited partners even though the limited partners and Richins had
agreed that he could represent them in an attempt to settle and
buy out the general partner interest (C.

171); Sampson did not

correctly substitute his professional corporation for that of
Richins since he improperly signed the amended certificates (C.
182); Sampson improperly purchased a judgment which had been
entered against Richins in direct violation of §78-51-27 (F.
109-10); Sampson incorrectly substituted AG Management for his
professional corporation and therefore the latter had no legal
authority.

(C. 192).

At the same time, the lower court found that Richins violated
§48-2-9 U.C.A. in attempting to secretly deed the partnership
properties to his other corporate entities (C.

168-69); that the

promissory notes which he executed did not comply with the various
articles of the limited partnerships and therefore was not
repayable as a priority interest as he repeatedly proclaimed to
the other limited partners (F.

102-03); that he gave contrary

instructions to the limited partners telling them to elect a new
general partner while at the same time telling them that the
partnership had been terminated and the assets would be
distributed (C.

170-7D; and that he erroneously sent termination

letters of the general partner's interest in direct violation of
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the partnership agreements and had misinterpreted §48-2-20
concerning the withdrawal of a general partner.

(C.

177-78).

The court found that as to Count I Sampson had violated the
attorney-client relationship but found no evidence of any damage
having occurred.

As to Count II he found that Sampson was

negligent in handling several lawsuits and awarded some $2,000 for
the cost incurred in setting aside a default judgment which had
been entered.
The court found that Sampson had intentionally interferred
with some of the defendants as claimed in the Fourth Cause of
Action on the Counterclaim.

The Court specifically rejected each

and every damage theory asserted by Defendants but concluded that
they were entitled to an award of $250,000 as "consequential
damages" and some $40,000 as damages for equity of defendants' own
limited partnerships.

The court rejected any claim for an

accounting as well as a claim for an injunction.
The lower court denied punitive damages against Sampson.

The

court found that Sampson acted in good faith in attempting to
negotiate settlements with Richins for the benefit of the limited
partnerships.

(F.

140). The court specifically found that

Sampson honestly believed that he was empowered to act for the
limited partnerships through various devices during the four-year
operation-

(F.

143-44).
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
POINT I

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MISCONSTRUED THIS
COURT'S DECISION OF LEIGH FURNITURE AMD
HAS MISSTATED THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO FIND
THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
-9-

ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
In 1982 this Court in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co.

v. Isomf

657 P.2d 293, for the first tine recognized the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic relations.
Since that decision there has been no other reported Utah
appellate case involving the interpretation of that decision or of
the elements required to establish this cause of action.

The

instant case is therefore the most recent pronouncement of the
Utah law as to this often-used claim for relief.

The decision of

the Court of Appeals, however, has misinterpreted both this
Court's prior decision and the necessary elements required for a
plaintiff to prevail.

It is for this reason that this Court

should review the present controversy in order to correct the
necessary elements of this tort.
In the Leigh Furniture case this Court adopted an
approach utilized by the Oregon Supreme Court in defining the
elements required to prove an action for intentional interference
of economic relations.

657 P.2d at 304.

In order to recover

damages this Court held that a plaintiff must prove (1) that the
defendant intentionally interferred with the plaintiff's existing
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.

Furthermore,

"privilege is an affirmative defense which does not become an
issue unless 'the acts charged would be tortious on the part of an
unprivileged defendant'."

Id. at 304.

In Leigh Furniture this Court concluded that in spite of
protracted action by the defendant against the plaintiff the
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evidence would not support a jury finding that the defendant's
predominant purpose was to ruin Isom's business merely for the
sake of injury alone and therefore refused to find an improper
motive in the actions of the defendant.

Id. at 308.

As to improper means this Court stated:
The alternative requirement of improper means
is satisfied when the means used to interfere with
a party's economic relations are contrary to law,
such as violations of statutes, regulations, or
recognized common-law rules. Such acts are
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are
clearly "improper" means of interference.
"Commonly included among improper means are
violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation,
defamation, or disparaging falsehood." Means may
also be improper or wrongful because they violate
"an established standard of a trade or
profession." Id. at 308. (Citing Top Service Body
Shop, Inc., 582 P.2d at 1371).
This Court concluded that the defendant's pursuit of two
groundless lawsuits against the plaintiff was an improper means.
It also sustained a finding of punitive damages since there was
sufficient evidence of malice to justify such an award.

Id.

at

313.
In its extensive decision the lower court listed nine
specific acts which it believed constituted improper means as
defined in the Leigh Furniture case.

These included: (1)

erroneous advice by Sampson that the markup charge by the
defendants was a breach of a fiduciary duty owned to the
partnership (Findings, p.

101); (2) Sampson's erroneous advice

that the advances made by the general partners would not have to
be repaid by the partnerships (Findings, pp.

103-05); (3)

Sampson's acts of collecting money on behalf of the partnerships
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(Findings, p.

105); (4) refusal of Sampson to deliver documents

of foreclosure to Richins after requested (Findings, p.

106); (5)

wrongfully utilizing a power of attorney to substitite general
partners (Finding, p.

107); (6) failing to properly amend the

limited partnership certificates (Findings, p.

109); (7)

obtaining an assignment of the Osborn judgment in violation of
§78-51-27 (Findings, p.

109); (8) Sampson substituting his

clients as plaintiffs in the Osborn case in violation of
§78-51-27 (Findings, p.

110); and (9) making use of facts

obtained while involved as an attorney client in violation of
ethical standards (Findings, p.

116).

Richins in the Court of Appeals expanded the "improper means"
actually relied upon by the lower court to a claimed 22 separate
acts.

(Respondents' and Cross Appellants' Brief, pp.

37-40).

The Court of Appeals listed 13 specific acts that "taken together
constitute improper means as defined by the Utah court in Leigh
Furniture." 102 Utah Adv.

Rpt. at 56-57.

The Court of Appeals also found that "negating 'good faith'
is not an element of a prima facie case of intentional
interference with economic relations in Utah." The Court concluded
that if Sampson uses the term "good faith" in the sense that he is
claiming his acts were "privileged" then Sampson had the burden of
raising this issue as an affirmative defense.

102 Utah Adv.

Rpt.

57.
Petitioner submits that the decision by the Court of Appeals
is erroneous for three reasons: first, the majority of the acts
listed by the Court of Appeals do not constitute "improper means"
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under this Court's decision in Leigh or in the Oregon decisions
upon which this Court relied; second, the lower court and the
Court of Appeals failed to recognize that a lack good faith is a
prima facie element for a plaintiff to establish to show certain
actions are indeed "improper"; third, the element of "good faith"
is not equated to a privilege and therefore is not an affirmative
burden upon a defendant.
Many of the "improper means" listed by the Court of Appeals
concerned improper advice or actions taken under erroneous
assumptions.

For example, Sampson's statements to the limited

partners concerning the markups and the loan advances while
characterized by the Court of Appeals as being "misrepresented"
and "false" were found by the lower court merely to be errors in
legal opinion.

(Conclusions, p.

189; 166, 170).

Other alleged

improper means include technical violations of statutes such as
the failure to properly amend the certificates of limited
partnerships or to properly substitute one general partner for
another.

The third category concerns violations of the Code of

Professional Responsibility as an attorney.

The fourth and final

category includes alleged wrongful action taken with regard to the
corporate assets and liabilities during the four years that
Sampson acted as general partner.
The majority of the listed acts are not the type of predatory
conduct which should give rise to a claim of intentional
interference with economic relations and, for example, the failure
to give proper legal advice should not subject every practicing
attorney to a subsequent claim five years later.

-13-

In Leigh

Furniture, for example, in spite of the numerous acts of the
defendant against the plaintiff in the operation of the business,
657 P.2d at 306, this Court found only the bringing of "two
groundless lawsuits" as the improper means of interference.
at 308-309.

Idk_

Thus, not every act undertaken in a business

controversy can be deemed to be a "improper means."
Likewise, merely because a person fails to amend limited
partnership agreements should not make him subject to a tortious
interference claim.

This Court and the Oregon Courts did not

intend every innocent violation of any rule or statute to give
rise to liability when no predatory conduct is involved.

Here

there was no violence, deceit, or unfounded litigation which is
the conduct that the "improper means" test was designed to
prevent.
The second error committed by the Court of Appeals was
failing to give any credance to Sampson's intent.

The Court of

Appeals and the lower court merely concluded that once a statute
has been shown to have been violated that this violation on its
face constitutes grounds for allowing imposition of damages.

The

good faith or intent of the perpetrator was not considered
relevant by either the Court of Appeals or the lower court.
Although the lower court found that Sampson had an improper
purpose in the actions he took, the Court of Appeals did not
address the issue of "improper purpose" but chose to affirm only
upon "improper means".

102 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 56.

Petitioner

submits that the lower court was clearly wrong in concluding that
an improper purpose existed in Sampson's conduct since there is no

question from the court's own factual findings that he was
representing a number of limited partners who had substantial
investments in the partnerships and who had a real motive in
trying to keep the businesses operating.
Terrace Apts., Inc., 343 S.2d 851 (Fla.

See, Serafino v. Palm
App.

1976); Re_sJ:^temen_t

of Torts 2d, §769.
The lower court specifically found in denying punitive
damages that Sampson acted in good faith throughout these
proceedings even though many of his actions were ultimately
declared wrong or illegal by courts along the way.
Findings of Fact, pp. 139-144.

See,

In one particular passage the

lower court made this summary:
[I]t is my opinion that as wrong as Sampson
was in many of the things he did, I think he
believed himself to be right in doing what he did
and the way he did them. He should have known the
law, but I do not believe he intentionally
violated it. For almost six months he worked
amicably with Richins on settlement. When that
failed, by powers of attorney he got proxies to
vote the limited partners' interests. He did so,
electing his PC general partner. When that was
said to be contrary to law, he voted AG Management
in as a general partner and so operated. By the
time Judge Palmer ruled that illegal, Sampson was
able to carry on under a color of authority by
receipt of an IRS certificate of sale, followed by
two favorable rulings by Judge Cornaby until the
IRS sale was voided in May, 1964 (sic) by a
federal court order.
The bitterness and contention that developed
and existed between the two men was long and drawn
out and led to prolonged controversies which had
its roots in serious problems already existing
before Sampson entered the ring. But I do not
believe the evidence preponderates in establishing
the type of willful and malicious conduct, nor the
lessened type, required by our Supreme Court
decision to justify or support an award of
punitive damages and I so find. Findings of Fact,
pp. 143-44.
-15-

Thus, in spite of the conclusion by the lower court that
Sampson sincerely believed that the actions he was taking were
valid during the entire course of proceedings, the court concluded
that the acts themselves constituted an illegal means giving rise
to liability.

Thus, intent and motivation behind the acts was not

considered relevant by either the lower court or the Court of
Appeals.

The failure to examine good faith and intent is clearly

improper under the standards adopted by this Court.
Before a "means" can be deemed to be "improper" the conduct
of the accused must be examined.

For example, in GM Ambulance

v. Canyon State Ambulance, 739 P.2d 203 (Ariz. App. 1987) an
ambulance company was sued by a competitor on the basis that: it
had violated a state law.

The defendant countered by stating it

had received written permission from the governing state agency to
perform the conduct which was later ruled illegal.

The Arizona

Court of Appeals cited the Leigh Furniture case as standing
for the proposition that conduct specifically in violation of
statutory provisions has been held as an improper interference.
The Court stated, however:
We believe, however, that Canyon State's
violation of the statute is outweighed by the good
faith reliance on the letter. Canyon State relied
on the opinion of the very department charged with
regulating its conduct. Under such circumstances
we do not believe that it acted improperly so as
to subject itself to liability for the tort of
interference with contract. Id. at 205.
This Court in Leigh Furniture recognized that the terms
"improper means or improper purpose" are functionally equivalent
to "wrongful or malicious".

657 P.2d at 305.

— 1 C —

Certainly, the mere

fact that a person improperly amends a certificate of limited
partnership, in good faith attempts to use an invalid power of
attorney, or fails to properly transfer authority from one general
partner to another should not give rise to tortious liability
without the showing of bad faith or maliciousness.
This error is further compounded by the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that "good faith" and "privilege" are the same and that
it is up to Sam[pson to bear that burden.
57.
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The Oregon Supreme Court upon which this Court based its

standard of intentional interference defined a privilege as
follows:
In Wampler, we said that a person who
interferes with a contract is not always
responsible for the resultant injury. When the
person acts to promote ". . .an interest which is
equal or superior in social value to that with
which he interferes, his actions are said to be
privileged or justified. Welch v. Bamcorp
Management Advisors, Inc., 675 P.2d 172, 176 (Or.
1983) .
Thus, even after a court has concluded that certain conduct
would give rise to liability a defendant can claim a privilege on
the assertion that he is essentially exempt from such liability
because of a status or other reason.

For example, a business

advisor is privileged to give advice without fear of a tortious
suit.

Parker v. Gordon, 442 S.2d 273 (Fla.

Angeles Airways, Inc.

App.

1984); Los

v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.

1982).

This privilege exists even if the financial advisor receives a
financial gain himself.
1026 (D.

Lichtie v. U.S.

Home Corp., 655 F. Supp.

Utah 1987) .

If the standard of tortious interference is as stated by the
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Utah Court of Appeals a defendant who can claim no legal privilege
but who acts in complete good faith in a transaction is subject
to liability even upon the showing of a technical violation of a
statute or regulation.

Under the Court of Appeals' interpretation

there is no opportunity for a defendant to argue his motive if the
plaintiff is proceeding under the "improper means" course of
proving liability.

The filing of any lawsuit which is later lost,.

the reliance upon any legal advice which is later proven wrong, or
a number of other occurrences which happen daily in business
transactions would, under the Court of Appeals' analysis, give
rise to immediate liability regardless of the motive or intention
of the party.
It is therefore essential that this Court accept certiorari
of this case so that it can clarify that before the violation of a
statute, regulation, or course of conduct can be deemed "improper"
there must be established a malicious or bad faith motive in
perpetrating these acts.

Furthermore, it is critical that this

Court clearly define the types of "means" which can give rise to
liability to eliminate conduct which clearly was never intended to
give rise to tortious liability.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY APPLIED
APPELLATE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION IN
CREATING A FINDING OF FACT FOR SPECIAL
DAMAGES WHICH WAS NEVER MADE BY THE
LOWER COURT AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO
THE LOWER COURT'S SPECIFIC FINDINGS.
Anyone reading the 234-page opinion of Judge Croft would
believe that no substantial damage had been awarded to the
defendants against Sampson until the very last page of the opinion
-18-

is read.

In other words, the $250,000 figure appears like a

phantom in the night.

There is no previous reference to this

amount in either the Findings, Conclusions or Verdict.
The lower court specifically rejected each and every damage
claim asserted by Richins against Sampson.

See, Verdict, pp.

228-30; Findings, p. 105, 124-37; Conclusions, p. 198-205, 215-16;
and Verdict, p. 209-32.
The only reference to the $250,000 judgment is found on page
232, two pages before the decision ends.

The court stated:

As stated before, damages are in tort, not in
contract, rendering liability for damages for
either the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the
contract or consequential for which the tortious
interference is the legal cause. I think as to
some claim for damages, of at least a
consequential nature, have been shown with a
reasonable degree of certainty by a preponderance
of the evidence.
The only other indication giving any enlightenment as to ^he
composition of the $250,000 figure is seen in the Court's oral
colloquy with Sampson's trial counsel during the hearing to
amend the Findings.

A copy of this portion of the transcript is

contained in the appendix of this Petition.

The lower court

basically took the position that the $250,000 figure was analogous
to a jury bringing in a $25,000 figure in a $100,000 suit.
26) .

(Tr.

The Court stated that ^it was not obligated to say what the

$250,000 is comprised.

(Tr. 31). The Court stated that

"recovery wasn't based upon contract relationships.

It was a tort

just like you run a red light and crash into your car.
tort and you are injured.
damages.

But how much?

I commit a

And you are entitled to recover
Well, the jury said $25,000.
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You wanted

$100,000,

You get $25,000, you see."

(Tr. 23).

The Court concluded by saying that in no sense of the word
could it give Richins $5 million, $6 million, $9 million or $12
million as he requested because the evidence wasn't there.
$250,000 is just the amount the court came up with.

The

It is not,

according to the court, required to break it down into advances
not recovered, improper expenditure of attorney fees by Sampson,
or overhead expenses.

(Tr. 31).

It is therefore obvious from reviewing the Findings of the
lower court together with the court's own explanation that it
regarded the award of $250,000 as general damages with no
requirement to specifically explain the basis.

Sampson vigorously

argued before the Court of Appeals that awards in tortious
interference cases are of a nature of a special damage and that
the lower court's reasoning was incorrect.

See, Restatement of

Torts 2d, §774A; 25 C.J.S.

617; Hycel Inc.

§2 Damages, p.

American Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp.
Clark v. Ferro Corp., 237 F. Supp.

190, 193 (D.

230, 238 (D.

Tex.

Tenn.

v.
1971) ;

1964).

The Court of Appeals agreed with Sampson's assertion by
stating "we agree that Judge Croft was under the mistaken belief
that he need not identify the exact basis for his award." The
Court of Appeals then stated, "However, this Court can affirm the
judgment if any legal basis exists to justify the trial court's
award. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co.

v. U.W.C.

Associates, 752

P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988)
The Court of Appeals then undertook to justify the award of
damages based upon the preceding rule of appellate review together

with the other principle that once damages have been established
the exact amount may be based upon estimations since the defendant
may not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be
proved with precision.

102 Utah Adv.

Rpt. at 58.

The Court of Appeals then took an incredible leap and
essentially wrote its own Finding of Fact as to what the $250,000
was based upon.

The Court concluded that because Judge Winder in

May of 1984 had found the IRS sale to be invalid that from that
point on all money retained in the bank account of the general
partner by Sampson must necessarily have been damages accruing to
the defendant.
This conclusion is remarkable for several reasons.

First, by

Judge Croft's own finding the amount in the bank account as of
October 29, 1984 would have been $288,597—not $250,000.

The rule

cited by the Court of Appeals as to the approximation of uncertain
damages applies to cases involving damages such as lost profits cr
loss of a bargin but certainly does not apply to a simple
arithematic calculation of a bank account.

Second, while the

final accounting may have occurred on October 29, 1984 it was not
until January 5, 1985 that Richins obtained an order from Judge
Cornaby vacating his prior orders which gave Sampson the right to
control the partnership.

(F.

83-84).

Thus, if any date was to

have any relevance at all when Sampson ceased having legal
authority to operate the corporation it would have been the
January date to which no evidence was ever offered by Richins.
Next, the "finding" of the Court of Appeals assumed that the
assets in the bank were not used on behalf of the limited
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partnerships but were retained by Sampson.
specifically found this not to be the case.

The lower court
The Court stated:

Upon closing argument counsel for defendants
stated that Sampson and twelve people ended up
with all the "Richtron assets'1. He probably meant
partnership assets, but as I noted in my Findings
and Conclusions, no evidence was placed in the
record establishing that such was in fact the
case, but if so, absent any such evidence, I
cannot consider this statement as a factor upon
which this decision can be made. I have
repeatedly noted the absence of evidence as to
what finally happened to the partnerships and
their properties other than a schedule showing
only the date upon which foreclosures presumably
took place. (F. 221-222).
The Court also noted a short time later, "I think it is clear from
the evidence that most of the funds that passed through Sampson's
hands were paid out on partnership expenses."

(F. 222).

The Court of Appeals recognized the inconsistency in its
creation of a finding not made by the lower court.

It stated,

however:
There are admittedly alternative, inconsistent
findings before this Court, and ordinarily we
would resort to the underlying record to determine
which finding of fact is accurate. However,
Sampson's failure to provide a complete transcript
prevents us from reviewing the underlying
evidence. Thus, we assume the evidence supports
the trial court's Findings of Fact which in turn
supports its ultimate damage award. See, e.g.,
Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, 922
(Utah 1988). 102 Utah Adv. Rptr. at 58.
Certiorari is appropriate in this case since the Court of
Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings which requires this Court's power of
supervision to be exercised.

The rule concerning affirming a

judgment of the lower court was never meant to allow an appellate
court to create a factual finding which does not exist.

The rule

is strictly limited to alternative legal theories.
Buehner Block Co.

v. U.W.C.

See, e.g.

Associates, 752 P.2d 392 (Utah 1983)

(while one construction of the contract was erroneous another
construction allowed affirmance of the lower court); Rice,_Melty
Enterprise, Inc.

v. Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1932)

(decision based upon statute of limitation net addressed since
parole evidence rule precluded judgment in plaintiff's favor);
Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1983) (lower court
decision based on constructive trust erroneous but decision
affirmed on basis of a purchase money resulting trust).

The

appellate rule of construction cannot be used to create factual
findings which are not present in the lower court's findings :>f
fact and conclusions of law.
It is fundamental that the failure of the trial court to make
findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the
facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v.
Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983).

The findings of fact must

show that the court f s judgment or decree "follows logically from
and is supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423,
426 (Utah 1986).

The findings "should be sufficiently detailed

and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was reached."
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).

Where special

findings have been made, an appellate court cannot assume a
non-existent factual finding which is a material issue to
recovery.

"Because the trial judge elected to make special
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findings and because he did not make a finding on all material
factual issues necessary to recovery, the judgment must be
reversed." Briscoe v. Pittman, 522 P.2d 886 (Or.

1974).

The

Supreme Court of New Mexico found reversible error in the failure
of the lower court to enter findings respecting special damages
allegedly suffered by plaintiffs caused by odors emitted by the
defendant's plant.

Aguayl v. Village of Chama, 449 P.2d 331 (N.M.

1969) .
It is difficult to conceive of a more flagrant violation of
the preceding rules of appellate construction than in the instant
case.

Here, the lower court entered the figure of $250,000 as

damages with no attempt to explain the special nature of such
award.

The reason for such failure was simply the lower court's

erroneous conclusion that consequential damages in tortious
interference cases are of a general nature and do not have to be
itemized.

The court clearly stated this to counsel in the motion

to amend the findings.
The Court of Appeals recognized the error committed by the
lower court but rather than vacating the decision or, at the
minimum, remanding it for further proceedings undertook to create
findings of special damages on its own accord even though (1) the
amount of damages was different than that awarded by the lower
court; (2) the time utilized by the Court of Appeals was
inconsistent with the lower court's findings as to when Sampson
lost the color of authority to act on behalf of the partners; (3)
the award was inconsistent with the lower court's specific
conclusions that there was no showing that Sampson retained any of

the funds for his own personal use.
This Court should therefore exercise its supervisory powers
to correct this erroneous application of established rules of
appellate procedure,
CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower court and the Court of Appeals must
be reviewed by this Court in order to avoid misapplication of
principles governing causes of action in claims of tortious
interference.

The decision as it is now written allows any

plaintiff to claim damages for the violation of any trifling
regulation, statute, or code of ethics without any regard of the
motivation or intent of the defendant.

This Court should accept

this case for the purpose of clarifying the type of "improper
means" which give rise to liability as well as clarifying how the
element of "good faith" comes into play as to the various burdens
of the parties.
Second, while the issue of damages will not affect any other
persons except that of the defendant the Court of Appeals'
misapplication of established rules of appellate procedure require
this Court's exercise of its supervisory powers to correct an
obvious injustice.
For these reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Writ
of Certiorari be granted.
DATED this 17th day of April, 1989.

Craig S. C$6k
Attorney for John P. Sampson

-25-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to John T.
Anderson, Attorney for Respondents, Suite 600, Valley Tower, 50
West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah this 17th day of April, 1989.
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COPY OF THE LOWER COURT FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND VERDICT ARE CONTAINED
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the court must consider the juvenile's right to a fair
trial under the sixth amendment. Id. The court
concluded that closure should not occur unless the
court makes specific supported findings that closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. The court then reversed the trial court's closure order due to unsupported factual findings. Id. at 580-81.
In Taylor v. State, 438 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1982) cert,
denied 459 U.S. 1149, the court affirmed the
juvenile court's order permitting the media to
attend a hearing involving a juvenile charged with
committing robbery resulting in bodily injury. The
Indiana statute permitted the juvenile court to determine whether the public should be excluded from
the proceedings and stated that the court shall consider that the best interests of the community are
generally served by the public's ability to obtain
information about charges that would be a felony if
committed by an adult. The court concluded that
under the express language of the statute, the
charged crime fell within the class of cases for which
access and disclosure are deemed generally to serve
the best interest of the public. Taylor, 438 N.£.2d at
280-81.
3. Kearns-Tribune has not differentiated the two
types of proceedings in its arguments, and, therefore, contends that all types of juvenile court proceedings should be presumptively open to the public.
4. Section 78-3a-l was amended in 1988, but
because the section is substantive rather than procedural, we apply the version of the statute in effect
at the time the cause of action arose. Carlucci v.
Utah State Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336
(Utah 1986)). Also, the changes made in the statute
do not affect our analysis.
5. Kearns-Tribune also asserts that article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which states
"[a]U courts shall be open,* provides further support
for its position that juvenile court proceedings
should be presumptively open. Article I, section 11
provides, 'All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this State ... any civil cause to which he
is a party." The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
section 11 "guarantees access to the courts and a
judicial procedure that is based on fairness and
equality." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d
670, 675 (Utah 1985). In addition, the constitutional
guarantee of access to the courthouse was intended
to confer a remedy by due course of law for injuries
to person, property or reputation. Id. We reject
Kearns-Tribune's suggestion that section 11 mandates that all courts should be physically open. In
addition, Kearns-Tribune has not asserted how the
guarantee of access to the courthouse for a remedy
to injury is relevant to arguments relating to
freedom of the press.
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OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant, John P. Sampson, appeals
the money judgment entered against him in favor
of defendants-respondents, Richtron, Inc., Rkhtron Financial Corporation, and Richtron
General (referred to collectively throughout this
opinion as 'Rkhtron'). The trial court found
Sampson intentionally interfered with Ricntron's
economic relations and awarded judgment to 1)
Richtron Financial Corporation, as a limited
partner, in the amount of $30,974.50, 2) Richtron, Inc., as a limited partner, in the amount of
$4,222.50, and 3) Richtron, Inc. and Rkhtron
General, as general partners, in the amount of
$250,000. Richtron cross-appeals the trial
court's refusal to award additional compensatory
and punitive damages. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Sampson filed the original complaint in this case
to enforce an Oregon judgment previously obtained by Robert Osborn against Richtron which
Sampson subsequently purchased from Osborn.
Richtron answered the complaint alleging a
variety of defenses to the Oregon judgment, and
counterdaimed seeking six affirmative claims for
relief against Sampson.
The case was tried without a jury before Senior
Judge Bryant Croft. During the eleven-day trial,
the court heard twenty-three witnesses and received approximately 398 exhibiu. Judge Croft
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drafted a 177 page 'memorandum and summation
of evidence* and entered "findings of fact and
conclusions of law and verdict" consisting of 234
pages. Both counsel in their briefs and this court
commend Judge Croft for his extraordinary
efforts.
In bringing this appeal, Sampson ordered only
a portion of the transcript of the proceedings
below. Subsequent motions to supplement the
record were denied. Richtron did not order additional portions for purposes of its cross-appeal.
Consequently, both parties concede they are
bound by Judge Croft's voluminous findings of
fact, and only contend on appeal that the trial
court's findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law and judgment. Specifically,
Sampson claims the trial court's findings do not
support the elements of intentional interference
with Rkhtron's economic relations nor the corresponding damages awarded to Richtron. Richtron cross-appeals claiming the trial court erred
1) in refusing to award additional compensatory
damages for partnership funds diverted by
Sampson and for loans Richtron advanced to the
partnerships, and 2) in refusing to award Richtron
punitive damages.
FACTS
We set out only those facts found by the trial
court that are relevant to the issues on appeal.
Between October 15, 1973, and March 1, 1980,
Paul Richins created twenty-five limited partnerships in which either Richtron, Inc., or Richtron
General, its subsidiary, acted as the sole general
partner. Both Richtron, Inc. and Richtron
General were owned and controlled by Richins.
The limited partnerships were created for the
purpose of acquiring, operating, and holding for
resale farm properties located in the states of
Utah, Idaho, and Oregon.
Substantially identical limited partnership agreements were prepared for each of the twentyfive partnerships providing, in relevant part, that
the general partner had the exclusive authority to
conduct the affairs of the limited partnerships,
and that the limited partners were required to
make annual cash contributions to meet partnership expenses. The agreements disclosed that the
agricultural properties previously purchased on
contract by one of the Richtron companies were
being resold to the limited partnerships at a
profit.
During 1979 and early 1980, many of the
limited partners refused to pay the partnership
expense assessments made by Richtron. By May
1990, the limited partnerships were confronted
with substantial and increasing financial difficulties due, in part, to the failure of many limited
partners to pay their agreed assessments andv in
part, to overall management problems. As a
result, Richtron loaned substantial amounts of
money to the limited partnershitK to meet delinquent and current land contract installment obli.garjons, well-drilling expenses, as well as other
operating expenses. By June 1980, the aggregate
amount of Rkhtron's loans, all of which were
required by the partnership agreements to be
repaid, exceeded $300,000.
UTAH
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Sampson first became involved with the limited
partnerships in May 1980, when he was retained
as an attorney by two limited partners to attend 1
meeting of the Catlow Valley limited partners.
Richins called the meeting to discuss, among
other financial concerns, the existence of the
"Osborn judgment' and that Osborn was willing
to settle the dispute upon payment of a stipulated
sum. The trial court made the following findings
concerning Sampson's participation in the May
1980 meeting:
[Sampson's] actions there were a bit
more than just privately counseling his
two clients, for he not only orally
recommended to those at the meeting
and got started the movement to have
Richtron Financial file for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 proceedings, but he
also expressed the legal opinion to all
present that he did not think Richtron
Financial could keep the mark-up
equity arising from Richtron Financial's resale of the farm property to
the Catlow Valley partnerships for an
amount in excess of what it paid for
it, which was a theme winch Sampson
repeatedly expressed in the months
and years ahead.
It was at this meeting that Sampson began his
concentrated efforts to take control of the twentyfive limited partnerships. Sampson never invested
in any of the partnerships, and from all indications, throughout his efforts, represented only two
of approximately 130 limited partners.
In June 1980, as a result of ongoing pressure
from Sampson, Richins purported to cause the
withdrawal of Richtron, Inc. and Richtron
General as general partners of the limited partnerships. Richins informed the limited partners that
he would proceed to wind up and terminate partnership affairs, but none of the partnerships were
ever terminated. Following his announcement,
Richins agreed to permit Sampson to receive
partnership assessments. Under this agreement,
Sampson was required to forward funds to Richtron to pay pressing partnership obligations.
Sampson did not comply with the agreement, and
instead placed partnership contributions in his
trust accounts.
At the Catlow Valley partnership meeting,
Sampson suggested to his clients that they purchase all of Rkhtron's interests in the limited
partnerships. Thereafter, Sampson and Richins
attempted to negotiate a buy-out of Rkhtron's
interests for $700,000. The buy-out agreement
provided that Richtron would be reimbursed for
the loans it had made to the limited partnerships.
Despite the negotiations between Sampson and
Rkhins, Sampson informed a number of limited
partners that Richtron was not entitled to repayment. Sampson expressed this opinion frequently
both orally and through letters sent to all investors. As a result of Sampson's statements, many
of the limited partners objected to the buy-out
agreement, and no sale of Rkhtron's interest
occurred. Soon after the buy-out agreement
failed, Sampson resumed his efforts to take

LNCE REPORTS
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control of the partnerships and exclude Richins.
Sampson first attempted to gam control by
requesting the limited partners to execute powers
of attorney. Sampson told the partners that such
action was necessary to remove Richins and his
companies as general partners and to commence
legal action against them.
After obtaining powers of attorney from an
unknown number of limited partners, Sampson
incorporated the John P. Sampson Professional
Corporation. Relying on the powers of attorney,
Sampson attempted to elect his professional corporation as the successor general partner of each
of the limited partnerships, in violation of the
Utah Professional Corporation Act, Utah Code
Ann. §§16-11-1 to-15 (1987).
Sampson was notified by court order that his
corporation was not authorized to become a
general partner in an agricultural enterprise.
Thereafter, Sampson incorporated Ag Management, and attempted to substitute it as general
partner of the limited partnerships. On November
24, 1982, a district court ruled that Sampson's
efforts to substitute Ag Management as the
general partner were legally invalid, and that
Richtron was and always had been the only authorized general partner to act on behalf of the
limited partnerships.
Within seven months of Sampson's attendance
Mt the Citlow VtUey partnership
meeting,
Sampson had assumed actual but not legal control
of the twenty-five partnerships through a variety
of means and was receiving and disbursing all
partnership funds at his discretion. He continued
his unauthorized control for over four years
acting both in his individual capacity and as an
attorney representing the interests of two limited
partners. During this same period, Sampson also
acted as legal counsel for Richtron, and on
several occasions defended Richtron in lawsuits.
In at least five instances, however, Sampson
neglected the lawsuits against Richtron and
allowed them to go to default. Sampson, on other
occasions, revealed to third parties confidential
information he had obtained in the course of his
representation of Richtron.
During the summer of 1982, Sampson frequently contacted the Internal Revenue Service, and
provided it with information concerning Richtron's internal business affairs. Eventually, the
IRS conducted a tax sale wherein Sampson appeared as the only bidder, and purportedly acquired substantially all of Richtron's assets. A
United States district court judge voided the tax
sale by court order dated May 16,1984.
From June 27, 1980, to October 29, 1984,
approximately $1,522,000 in limited partnership
funds were deposited in the various accounts over
Which Sampson had control. From these accounts, Sampson withdrew over $100,000 in attorney fees and $78,000 to cover miscellaneous
overhead expense. Despite several federal and
state court orders declaring that neither Sampson
nor Ag Management were authorized to act as
general partners, Sampson continued to solicit
and receive funds from limited partners and exercise control over the various limited partnerships.
The trial court also found that throughout
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Sampson's four-year period of control, he repeatedly ignored Richtron's limited partnership
interests by failing to communicate and generally
keep Richtron abreast of partnership activities.
Based on the facts set forth above. Judge Croft
concluded that Sampson's intentional neglect of
Richtron Financial's and Richtron, Inc.'s limited
partnership interests caused them to lose their
original capital contributions. Accordingly, Judge
Croft awarded Richtron Financial $30,974 50, and
Richtron, Inc. $4,222.50, which represented their
respective capital interests. Finally, Judge Croft
awarded Richtron General and Richtron, Inc , as
general partners, $250,000 based on Sampson's
intentional interference with their economic relations.
Both Sampson and Richtron argue on appeal
that the trial court's legal conclusions and judgment are not supported by its findings of fact As
a subsidiary issue, Sampson claims that many of
Judge Croft's 'findings of fact* are really
'conclusions of law/ and therefore, his challenges are properly before this court notwithstanding his failure to order a complete transcript of
the proceedings below.

UTAHADVAH

STANDARD OF REVIEW
R. Utah Ct. App. ll(eX2) provides, with our
emphasis, *[i]f the appellant intends to urge on
appeal that a Finding or conclusion is unsupported
by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion * In
essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this
court with Mil evidence relevant to the issues
raised on appeal. 'Where the record before us is
incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence
as a whole and must therefore presume that the
verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence.' Smith v. Vmacb, 699 P 2d 763,
765 (Utah 1985). Accord flevan v. J.H. Constr
Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983Km absence of
a transcript, we presume the trial proceedings
were proper and judgment was supported by the
evidence).
Accordingly, because the enure record in this
case is not before this court, we presume the trial
court's findings are supported by competent and
sufficient evidence, "[hjowever, ... the findings
must themselves be sufficient to provide a sound
foundation for the judgment, and conversely
any proper judgment can only be entered in accordance with the findings.' Forbush v. Forbush,
578 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1978). Therefore, our
review is strictly (united to whether the trial
court's findings of fact support its conclusions of
law and judgment.
In this regard, findings of fact 'must clearly
indicate the 'mind of the court' and must resolve
all issues of material fact necessary to justify the
conclusions of law and judgment entered
thereon/ Pmrks v. Zions First Ntt'l Bank, 673
P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983Xfootnotes omitted). See
Mlso KinkdlM v. fiaugft, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah
1983Kfaihire to enter adequate findings of fact is
generally reversible error). 'Findings should be
limited to the ultimate facts and if they ascertain
ultimate facts, and sufficiently conform to the
REPORTS
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pleadings and the evidence to support the judgment, they will be regarded as sufficient ....* Pearson
v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah
1577). A trial court need not resolve every conflkting evidentiary issue, "[njor is the court required to negate allegations in its findings of facts.'
Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah
1980).
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
In order to sustain a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic relations in
Utah, a plaintiff must establish, '(1) that the
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations,1 (2)
for an improper purpose or by improper means,
(3) causing injury to the plaintiff/ Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304
(Utah 1982).*
Improper Purpose or Means
In order to establish 'improper purpose* a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's interference is maliciously motivated, "in the sense
of spite and a desire to do harm to the plaintiff
for its own sake .../* Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d
at 307 (quoting W. Prosser, HMndbook of Law of
Torts §129 at 943 (4th ed. 1971)). In a case of
mixed motives, a court must determine the defendant's predominant purpose underlying his
conduct. Id. 'Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose make it prudent for commercial conduct to be regulated for the most part by
the improper means alternative, which typically
requires only a showing of particular conduct. ' Id,
The improper means element 'is satisfied where
the means used to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized
common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are clearly
'improper' means of interference.' Leigh Furniture, 657 PJtd at 306 (citations omitted). Improper means may also include "violence, threats
or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation,
bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or
disparaging falsehoods." Id. (quoting Top Serv.
Body Shop, Inc., 582 P-2d at 1371). 'Means, may
also be improper or wrongful ) ecause they violate
'an established standard of a trade or profession.' 9 Id.
With the foregoing principles in mind, we
address Sampson's challenges in this appeal.
First, Sampson claims the trial court's 'findings'
that Sampson had an 'improper purpose' and
employed 'improper means' are ultimate facts or,
in the alternative, conclusions of law, and are not
supported by the trial court's operative findings
of fact. Conversely, Ricfatron claims that these
'findings' are indeed findings of fact, and absent
the entire record, are not subject to attack on
appeal. See, e.g., Cornish Town v. Koikr, 758
PM 919,922 (Utah 1988).
We think the trial court's 'findings of fact'
that Sampson employed 'improper means' or had
an "improper purpose' are more accurately considered 'mixed questions of law and fact.' Cases
UTAH
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involving the application of law to facts are
hopelessly at odds with one another as to whether
the issue should be reviewed as a factual finding
or a legal conclusion. See Weiner, The Civil
Nonjury Trial and Law-Fact Distinction, 53
Calif. L. Rev. 1020, 1021-22 (1967). See a/so
Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of
Appellate Review in Disparate Treatment Cases Limiting the Rcmch of Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 403, 416-17 (1983).
However, we need not resolve the appropriate
standard of review, as we find the trial court's
voluminous and detailed operative factual findings overwhelmingly support its ultimate determination that Sampson employed improper means
as is discussed more fully below. Furthermore,
because we need only find either 'improper
purpose* <>r *iiprw«"cr means' to uphold the tnal
court, we do not address the issue of "improper
purpose/
Based on our review of Judge Croft's findings
of fact, we note at least thirteen acts that, taken
together, constitute improper means as defined by
the Utah Court in Leigh Furniture. Specifically,
these acts indude:
1. Sampson repeatedly misrepresented
to the limited partners that Rkhtron
was not entitled to be reimbursed for
the capital advances it made to the
limited partnerships or the disclosed
mark-ups on the agricultural property sold to each of the limited partnerships.
2. Sampson's frequent false statements that Rkhtron was not entitled to
its loan advances or mark-ups prevented an early settlement of the limited
partnership affairs.
3. Sampson undertook representation
of Rkhtron in several matters and at
the same time, undertook representation of interests that were clearly
adverse to Rkhtron in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
4. After agreeing to represent Rkhtron's legal interest in civil matters,
Sampson ignored these matters, and
allowed at least five cases to go to
default judgments against Rkhtron.
5. Sampson disclosed to third parties
confidential information he obtained
during the course of his representation
of Rkhtron in violation of his professional and fkluciary obligations.
6. Sampson repeatedly breached his
original agreement to serve as a repository for the deposit of partnership
funds and insure that all such funds
were duly transmitted to Rkhtron.
Instead, Sampson placed partnership
funds in his trust accounts.
7. Sampson's unauthorized control
over the various limited partnerships
for a period in excess of four years
included receiving and disbursing said
limited partnership funds. In doing so,
Sampson repeatedly directed limited
ICEREPOlTTS
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partners to send money to him and
not to Richtron.
t . Sampson executed invalid powers of
attorney, and attempted to use those
powers to substitute his newly created
professional corporation organized for
the purpose of practicing law, as a
general partner to an agricultural
partnership, in violation of the Utah
Professional Corporation Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§16-11-1 to-15
(1987).
9. After discovering he could not
substitute his professional corporation
as a general partner, Sampson attempted to substitute his newly created
corporation, Ag Management, as
general partner of the partnerships.
Despite a district court order in 1982,
rifrtaring that Sampson's efforts were
legally invalid, Sampson continued to
exercise unauthorized control over the
partnerships.
10. Sampson violated the Utah
Limited Partnership Act, Utah Code
Ann. §§4&-2-l to-27 (1989), by
refusing to amend the certificates of
the limited partnerships.
11. Sampson provided information to
the Internal Revenue Service for the
purpose of expediting a tax sale of
R i c h t r o n ' s interests. Thereafter,
Sampson appeared as the only bidder
at the sale.
12. Despite a federal district court
ruling that the IRS tax sale was void,
Sampson continued to exercise control
over the partnerships, and also continued to receive partnership funds.
13. Sampson purchased the "Osborn
judgment* in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §78-51-27 (1987)/
Notwithstanding the overwhelming nature of
his conduct, Sampson claims the trial court failed
to consider his 'good faith efforts* in undertaking a majority of the actions which the trial
court ultimately found constituted improper
means. His position is untenable. Negating "good
faith" is not an dement of a prima facie case of
intentional interference with economic relations in
Utah.9 Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. horn,
657 P J d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). Moreover, the
trial court's findings negate any conclusion that
Sampson acted in "good faith."
Finally, if Sampson uses the term "good faith"
in the sense that he is claiming his acts were
"privileged," Sampson bears the burden of raising
this issue as an affirmative defense. See Leigh
Furniture, 657 P M at 304. s^mr*^ Hid nt* r*i*>
faith or privilege as an a f f ™ * * ^ p4m*+
I he is now precluded from raising it for the
first time on appeal. See James v. Preston, 746
P J d 799, 801 (Utah a . App. 1987). In conclusion, Sampson's conduct is far more egregious
than the conduct found sufficient to constitute
improper means in Leigh Furniture. See 657 P J d
at 306. We have identified thirteen acts justifiedly
labeled "improper means," spanning a period of
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wefl over four years, and although "(t]aken in
isolation, each of the foregoing interferences with
(Richtron's interests] might be justified as an
overly zealous attempt to protect (Sampson's
interests in representing his clients]," Leigh Furniture, 657 PJ2d at 306, the cumulative effect,
nitm»n«rmg m the failure of the limited partnerships, "crossfed] the threshold beyond what is
i i v i i W » l *nA jiicrifiahk to what is tortious. * Id.

Cassation
Sampson claims the trial court's "conclusion"
that Sampson's interference caused Richtron
injury is not supported by the trial court's findings of fact, or in the alternative, the findings are
inconsistent with a conclusion of causation.
Whether causation has been established is a question of fact, sec W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts §129 at
991 (5th ed. 1984), and in the absence of a complete record, we assume the trial court's finding
of causation is supported by the evidence. See,
c.g.f Cornish Town v. Kolkr, 758 P J d 919, 922
(Utah 1988).
Furthermore, Sampson's daims of error with
regard to causation are more appropriately directed to the issue of damages. First, Sampson
claims that the limited partnership agreements
were terminable at will, thereby giving either
party the absolute right to withdraw from the
obligation at any time. Therefore, according to
Sampson, Richtron had no right to continue its
control over the limited partnerships in the future.
Second, Sampson claims the court's finding thai
"by May, 1980, Richins and his companies had
become confronted with substantial financial
problems, as well as others likewise mentioned
elsewhere, which were of such magnitude that
success in overcoming them seemed doubtful,"
precludes or is inconsistent with a conclusion that
Sampson's intentional interference caused Richtron injury.
As to the first daim, Sampson acknowledges in
his brief "at will termination is normally one
properly of damages rather than causation." As
to the second daim, there are substantial findings
to support the trial court's ultimate finding that
Sampson's conduct caused Richtron loss. Richtron operated the partnerships for many years
without foreclosures, and despite financial difficulties in 1980, Sampson offered $700,000 for
Richtron's interests in the limited partnerships at
the time he now daims those interests had no
value. Sampson's offer is evidence that he considered Richtron's interests worth a substantial
amount of money notwithstanding the purported
financial difficulties of the time. Based on the
foregoing, we affirm the trial court's finding of
causation.4
DAMAGES
Sampson's primary argument on appeal is that
the damage awards are not supported by the trial
court's findings of fact. Specifically, Sampson
claims the court erred in awarding 1) 5250,000 to
Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General as
•consequential damages," and 2) $30,974.50 to
Richtron Financial and $4,222.50 to Richtron Inc.
representing their original capital contributions to
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certain limited partnerships.
</ loss is generally lower than that required to estaWe emphasize that neither party is in a position blish the fact or cause of a loss.' Cook Assocs.,
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to Inc. v. Wamick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah
1983Kcitations omittedXemphasis in the original). Acsupport damages or the trial court's findings of
fact based thereon. Rather, our review is limited cord Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., Ill P.2d
to whether the trial court's findings of fact 773, 774 (Utah 1986); Terry v. Pane*, 631 P.2d
896, 898 (Utah 1981). "The amount of damages
support its award of damages.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts §774A at may be based upon approximations, if the fact of
55 (1979), provides that one who is ultimately damage is established, and the approximations are
deemed liable to another for interference with based upon reasonable assumptions or projecteconomic relations is liable for 'the pecuniary loss ions." Atkin Wright A Miles v. Mountain States
of the benefits of the contract or the prospective Tel. <ft Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330,336 (Utah 1985).
Judge Croft found that as of May 16, 1984,
relation; [or] consequential losses for which the
interference is a legal cause ....* Thus, Judge "Judge Winder's order ended then and there ...
Croft's findings must identify actual pecuniary [Sampson's] right to take any further steps in the
losses suffered by Richtron as a result of windup of any affairs of any partnership in which
the Richtron Companies remained as general
Sampson's conduct.
With respect to the $250,000 award to Rich- partners ...." Despite Judge Winder's order,
tron, Inc. and Richtron General, the trial court Sampson continued from that point to hold and
collect additional partnership funds. Accordingly,
made the following observation:
Judge Croft's finding provides a reasonable legal
As stated before, damages are in tort,
basis for awarding Richtron damages for
not in contract, rendering liability for
Sampson's wrongful use and control of partnerdamages for either the pecuniary loss
ship funds from the date of Judge Winder's
of the benefits of the contract or
J
order.
consequential for which the tortious
i
Judge Croft's findings as to the amount of
interference is the legal cause. I think
funds wrongfully retained by Sampson after May
that as to some claims for relief,
16,1984, include:
damages, of at least a consequential
nature, have been shown with a reasFrom the evidence the only informaonable degree of certainty by a preption the court has is that as of the date
onderance of the evidence.
Judge Winder made his ruling, the Ag
Sampson claims it was error for the trial court to
Management account had a balance of
refuse to identify the precise composition of the
about $28,700 which by October 29,
S250,000 award. We agree that Judge Croft was !
1984 had increased to over $43,000,
under the mistaken belief that he need not iden- I
while the account balance of Consolidated Farms as of October 29, 1984
tify the exact basis for his award. However, this
was $245,597, with $74,320 having
court can affirm the judgment if any legal oasis
been received since Judge Winder's
exists to justify the trial court's award. See, e.g.,
ruling and $12,000 having been disbBeuhner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d
ursed....
892, 895 (Utah 1988).
We note that in the context of a damage award, From these findings, it is clear that following
a trial court's findings of fact must provide a. Judge Winder's order, which unequivocally densufficient basis for this court to determine ounced Sampson's interest in partnership assets,
whether there is a rational legal basis as well as a the trial court concluded that Sampson deprived
sufficient factual basis for the award of damages. See, Richtron of the use and control of approximately
e.g., Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 $290,000. There are admittedly alternative, inconsistent findings before this court, and ordinarily
(Utah 1983). However,
we would resort to the underlying record to det[allthough an award of damages
ermine which finding of fact is accurate.
based only on speculation cannot be
I
However, Sampson's failure to provide a compupheld, it is generally recognized that
lete transcript prevents us from reviewing the
some degree of uncertainty in the
underlying evidence. Thus, we assume the evidevidence of damages will not suffice to
ence supports the trial court's findings of fact
relieve a defendant from recompensing
which in turn supports its ultimate damage award.
a wronged plaintiff. As long as there
See, e.g., Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919,
is some rational basis for a damage
922 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, we fmd that the
award, it is the wrongdoer who must
trial court's award of damages to Richtron, Inc.
assume the risk of some uncertainty.
and Richtron General has a rational basis and is
Where there is evidence of the fact of
supported by the trial court's findings of fact.
damage, a defendant may not escape
Finally, Sampson appeals the trial court's
liability
because the amount of
damage cannot be proved with preci\ award of damages to Richtron Financial and
sion.
| Richtron, Inc. in the amount of their original
capital investment in their respective limited parId. at 956 (emphasis added).
tnerships. Sampson claims the damages were
Further, "(o)nce a defendant has been shown to
awarded without a showing by Richtron that at
have caused a loss, ... the reasonable level of
the time Sampson took control of the partnerscertainty required to establish the amount of a
I hips, their limited partnership interests were worth

CODB«CO

Sampson

the original amounts contnbuted. In other words,
Sampson claims the evidence does not support the
trial court's findings. As we have stated repeatedly throughout this opinion, Sampson is precluded from causing dus challenge because he nas
failed to marshall the evidence. See, e.g., Harhhe
v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 19861.
Accordingly, the trial court's award to Richtron
Financial and Richtron, Inc. is affirmed.
Richtron's Cross-Appeal
In its cross-appeal, Richtron claims the trial
court erred in refusing to award as damages the
full amount collected and disbursed by Sampson
during the first twenty-eight months of his
unauthorized control of the limited partnerships.
Richtron also claims the trial court erred in declining to award damages to Richtron for ail the
loan advances it made to the limited partnerships.
We reemphasize that Richtron is held to the same
standards of review previously set forth in this
opinion.
As to Richtron's first claim, the trial court
found that most of the funds that passed through
Sampson's hands were paid out to satisfy partnership expenses. As a result, the trial court held
that to any extent the funds were used to pay
legitimate partnership obligations, Sampson was
entitled to a credit. Based on this finding, the tnal
court refused to award any of the $645,000 requested by Richtron. In the absence of a complete
record, we assume the court's findings are supported by the evidence, Cornish Town v. KoUer,
758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988), and the findings
dearly support the trial court's refusal to award
Richtron damages for the total amount collected
and disbursed by Sampson.
As to the second claim of error, the trial court
refused to award Richtron its loan advances based
on the following findings:
The evidence did not contain anything
about loan instruments having been
prepared when such advances were
made or repayments being made out
of gross receipts in accordance with
the 'terms of the loan instruments/ it
being noted here and I so find that the
promissory notes which Richins prepared on or about June 5, 1980 and
signed for the partnerships as president of the general partner, did not
constitute 'loan instruments* as that
term was used in the partnership agrIn addition, the court found that the circumstances triggering repayment as required by certain
other partnership agreements had not occurred.
Finally, the court observed:
Pit is apparent that repayment of the advances to
the general partners was conditional upon the end
results of each partnership, which leaves no assurance that any partnership, if properly wound
up, as provided by law and the partnership agreements, would have been able to repay any of the
obligations owed by it to the general partner for
such advances.

In sum, the trial court's findings do not
support Richtron's claim that Sampson's intentional interference deprived Richtron of the money
it had advanced to the limited partnerships, and
accordingly, we affirm the trial court's refusal to
award such advances.
Punitive Damages
Richtron's final claim of error on cross-appeal
is that the trial court erred in refusing to award
Richtron punitive damages. In order to recover
punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove the
defendant's conduct was willful and malicious, or
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference
and disregard toward the rights of others. See,
e.g„ Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1988). 'Whether punitive damages [should bej
awarded is generally a question of fact within the
sound discretion of the (fact finder],* and will not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Bisweil v.
Duncan,
742 P . 2 d 8 0 , 86 ( U t a h C t .
App. 1987).
Although there are sufficient findings to
support the reckless disregard standard for the
award of punitive damages, especially in light of
Sampson's professional and fiduciary obligations
as an attorney, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. The court heard
the evidence, and had the opportunity to observe
the witnesses. The tnal court clearly considered
the appropnate legal standards for imposing
punitive damages, and concluded Sampson's
conduct did not rise to the necessary level. Based
on the foregoing, the trial court's refusal to
award punitive damages was not an abuse of
discretion, and accordingly, we affirm.
CONCLUSION
In sum we hold that the trial court's findings of
fact support its conclusion that Sampson interfered with Richtron's economic relations by improper means, causing Richtron pecuniary loss. We
further find that the court's findings support its
award of damages to all of the Richtron parties.
Finally, we conclude the trial court's findings
support its refusal to award additional compensatory damages to Richtron and its refusal to
award punitive damages. Based on the foregoing,
the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. In Richmond, the Court observed that while the
issue of access to civil cases is not before the Court,
civil trials have historically been open to the public.
Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581 n.17. On the other
hand, in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Globe, she states that she interprets 'neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to
carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials.' Globe, 457 U.S. at 611.
2. Two jurisdictions have examined statutes which,
unlike the Utah statute, presume juvenile court
proceedings open unless closure is requested. In
Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d 577
(S.D. 1987), the court interpreted its state statute to
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allow judges discretion to admit certain enumerated
parties to the juvenile proceeding, id. at 579. The
court declined to interpret the statute to mean that
the judge must allow all enumerated persons access
to the hearing and stated that once closure is requested, the court must hold a hearing and take evidence on the need for closure. Id. The court stated
that the juvenile court must balance the competing
interest in the confidentiality and anonymity of a
juvenile court proceeding against the media's rights
under the first amendment. Id. at 578. In addition,
the court must consider the juvenile's right to a fair
trial under the sixth amendment. Id. The court
concluded that closure should not occur unless the
court makes specific supported findings that closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. The court then reversed the trial court's closure order due to unsupported factual findings. Id. at 580-81.
In Taylor v. State, 438 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1982) cert.
denied 459 U.S. 1149, the court affirmed the
juvenile court's order permitting the media to
attend a hearing involving a juvenile charged with
committing robbery resulting in bodily injury. The
Indiana statute permitted the juvenile court to determine whether the public should be excluded from
the proceedings and stated that the court shall consider that the best interests of the community are
generally served by the public's ability to obtain
information about charges that would be a felony if
committed by an adult. The court concluded that
under the express language of the statute, the
charged crime fell within the class of cases for which
access and disclosure are deemed generally to serve
the best interest of the public. Taylor, 438 N.E.2d at
280-81.
3. Kearns-Tribune has not differentiated the two
types of proceedings in its arguments, and, therefore, contends that all types of juvenile court proceedings should be presumptively open to the public.
4. Section 78-3a-l was amended in 1988, but
because the section is substantive rather than procedural, we apply the version of the statute in effect
at the time the cause of action arose. Carlucci v.
Utah StMte Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336
(Utah 1986)). Also, the changes made in the statute
do not affect our analysis.
5. Kearns-Tribune also asserts that article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which states
"[a)U courts shall be open/ provides further support
for its position that juvenile court proceedings
should be presumptively open. Article I, section 11
provides, "All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this State ... any civil cause to which he
is a party.* The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
section 11 "guarantees access to the courts and a
judicial procedure that is based on fairness and
equality/ Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d
670, 675 (Utah 1985). In'addition, the constitutional
guarantee of access to the courthouse was intended
to confer a remedy by due course of law for injuries
to person, property or reputation. Id. We reject
tarns-Tribune's suggestion that section 11 mandates that all courts should be physically open. In
addition, Kearns-Tribune has not asserted how the
guarantee of access to the courthouse for a remedy
to injury is rekvant to arguments relating to
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freedom of the press.
1. The Utah Supreme Court has declared that the
tort of intentional interference with economic relations protects both a party's existing contracts and
"interest in prospective relationships not yet reduced
to a formal contract (and perhaps not expected to
be)." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657
P.2d293, 302 (Utah 1982).
2. In announcing the elements of a prima facie case,
the Court discussed the history and development of
intentional interference with economic relations,
noting that the "blend of intentional and negligent
tort principles has produced two different approaches to the definition of this tort." Leigh Furniture,
657 P.2d at 302. The first approach, followed by
many jurisdictions and included in the first Restatement of Torts, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
that "the defendant intentionally interfered with his
prospective economic relations and caused him
injury. * Id. The defendant then bears the burden of
asserting privilege or justification as an affirmative
defense. Id. The second approach, modeled after
other negligent torts, requires a plaintiff to prove
"liability based on the interplay of various factors."
Id. at 303. This alternative approach is memorialized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §766 B
(1979). It is important to emphasize that the Utah
Court expressly rejected both approaches and chose,
instead, to follow "a middle ground" previously
adopted by the Oregon courts. Id. at 304 (citing Top
Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or.
201, 582 P.2d 1365 (1978)). Under Utah's approach,
improper purpose or means must be established as
part of a prima facie case and privilege is an affirmative defense, which only becomes relevant if
"'the acts charged would be tortious on the pan of
an unprivileged defendant.'" Id. at 304 (quoting Top
Serv. Body Shop, Inc., 582 P.2d at 1371).
4. Section 78-51-27 provides:
An attorney or counselor shall not:
(1) directly or indirectly buy, or be in
any manner interested in buying or
having assigned to him, for the purpose
of collection, a bond, promissory note,
bill of exchange, book debt, or other
thing in action, with the intent and for
the purpose of bringing an action
thereon.
(2) by himself, or by or in the name
of another person, either before or after
action brought, promise or give, or
procure to be promised or given, a valuable consideration to any person as an
inducement to placing, or in consideration of having placed, in his hands or in
the hands of another person a demand
of any kind for the purpose of bringing
action thereon or of presenting the
claimant in the pursuit of any civil
remedy for the recovery thereof; but this
subdivision does not apply to any agreement between attorneys and counselors
to divide between themselves the compensation to be received.
An attorney or counselor who violates either of
the foregoing subdivisions of this section is guilty of
a misdemeanor and shall be punished accordingly,
and his license to practice may be revoked or suspended.
5. Sampson relies on authority from jurisdictions
taking a different approach to the tort of intentional
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interference with economic relations. For instance,
Sampson cites a Texas decision wherein the court
found that the defendant acted in good faith which
justified his interference with the plaintiffs contract. See American Petrofina, fac. v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 679 S.W.2d 740, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
However, Texas courts do not require, as part of a
prima facie showing, that the defendant acted
'improperly." Rather, a plaintiff need only demonstrate 1) the existence of a contract, 2) intentional
and willful interference, 3) proximate causation, and
4) actual lost. Id. Additionally, on at least one other
occasion, a Texas court held that it was incumbent
upon the defendant to prove that his acts were
either justified or privileged. AnnendMriz v. Mora,
553 S. W.2d 400,405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
Similarly, Sampson cites Arizona authority where
the court found that the violation of a statute was
outweighed by the defendant's good faith reliance
on a letter from a state agency authorizing his
conduct. See G.M. Ambulance and Medical Supply
Co., v. Canyon State Ambulance, Inc., 153 Ariz.
551, 739 P.2d 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1987). However,
Arizona follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts
approach, one specifically rejected by our Supreme
Court. See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom,
657 P.2d 293,304 (Utah 1982).
6. Sampson further asserts that Richtron's claim for
intentional interference with economic relations is
barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel, and
the trial court's failure to so find constitutes reversible error. A trial court is not required to negate all
allegations in its findings of fact, Sorenson v. Beers,
614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980), and based on the
findings of fact, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Sampson failed to establish waiver or estoppel.
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PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals his conviction of driving
without a valid Utah license. The charge originated in the justice of the peace court where defendant was convicted. Upon his appeal to the
circuit court he was again convicted. Defendant
contends that he is a citizen of Wyoming and
possesses a valid Wyoming driver's license. His
Wyoming license was introduced as a trial exhibit.1
Therefore, he argues, he was not driving
without a valid driver's license.
Plaintiff Monticello City filed a motion to
summarily dismiss this appeal, asserting that
under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26<13)(a)
(1988), this court has no jurisdiction. We deferred
ruling upon the jurisdictional issue until after the
briefs were filed and the case was at issue in order
that defendant have a full opportunity to present
his case and because we had no record before us
of the justice and circuit court proceedings. We
now discuss the issue of our appellate court jurisdiction over appeals which originate in the justice
of the peace courts and are reviewed by trial
'anew* in the circuit courts.
We are prevented from reaching the merits of
defendant's appeal if we do not have jurisdiction
over the case. Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d
1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (the initial
inquiry of a court is to determine its own jurisdiction). Under section 77-35-26(13Xa), we have
jurisdiction over a criminal matter originating in a
justice court only when the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or statute has been raised in
the justice court. We therefore examine the
record to determine what issues were raised and
argued in the justice court.
We recognize that a justice of the peace court is
not a court of record, Utah Code Ann. §78-50.5 (1987), and a tape recording or transcript of
the proceedings in justice court is not necessarily
available. Section 77-35-26X13Xa) requires that
the requisite constitutional challenge be initiated
in the justice court. Without a reliable record of
the proceedings there it is difficult to ascertain
whether the proper issue was adequately raised
and preserved for review. However, an appeal
from the justice court affords defendant a trial
'anew" in the circuit court, which is a court of
record. Utah Code Ann. section 78-4-2 (1987).
We presume that if the challenge was properly
and adequately raised in the circuit court, then it
was also properly raised in the justice of the peace
court. Conversely, if a specific challenge to the
constitutionality or validity of a statute or ordinance was not raised in the circuit court, we
assume that it was not previously made an issue
in the justice court. Therefore, in order that the
proper, specific constitutional or statutory challenge be preserved, that challenge must clearly
have been raised in and presented to the circuit
court.
Upon review of the record filed herein, we find
that defendant did file a written motion to dismiss
the charge in the justice court. That motion was
essentially renewed in the circuit court and was
based upon his assertion that the city ordinance
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MR, HARMON:
In Objection No. 5, Your Honor, the Court in finding 232
acknowledges that there are damages of a consequential nature and
then, however, the Court does not go on with any to identify what
damages the Court is referring what evidence supports that
particular statement, and then the Court goes on and awards the
$250,000 in favor of the general partners and against Mr.
Sampson.

As we have outlined here on page 5, I think the Court

walked through all the various theories, and then the Court
dispelled most of these theories, and I guess our position is we
don't have any idea, Your Honor, where the $250,000 comes from.

THE COURT:
Do you have any idea when a jury comes in with a verdict for
$25,000 in a $100,000 as to where it got that figure?

I have

seen that hundreds of times in trials that I have presided over.
You don't know how they have arrived at those figures,
generally.
I gave considerable thought to this problem.
guess, one of my major things that I wrestled with.

It was, I
There wasn't

any doubt in my mind based upon the record made during the trial
that John Sampson had intentionally interferred with an existing
economic relationship, and that all of the elements, both the
means and the manner that were spelled out by our Supreme Court
as constituting elements of that particular tort to me were
clearly established by the evidence.

I think you will recall that while I could see Sampson's
representation of Richtron companies in various lawsuits was
probably—turned out to be a conflict of interest when he was
also opposing them, and that that might have been a breach of
duty, maybe there was a negligence on the part of Sampson as
alleged in one of the counts.

I felt that while those particular

counts may have been proven insofar as allegations of wrong doing
was concerned, the record didn't present specific evidence that
enabled me to say, yes, because he represented, and I expect
maybe Mr- Anderson might talk about this in his, because he
represented us in a dozen lawsuits, or was supposed to represent
us and failed to do so we had default judgments taken against
us.
The record doesn't tell me what the defendants' damages were
as a result of proximate cause of .those factors.

And I felt that

the tort, and I stress the tort aspect of the cause of action
about the intentional interference with an existing economic
relation, and I don't think we'll ever get a more clear cut
example of that being done than we have in
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this case.
But that particular thing was not a contract violation.
Recovery wasn't based upon contract relationships.

It was a tort

just like you run a red light and crash into your car.
a tort and you are injured.
damages.
$100,000.

But how much?

I commit

And you are entitled to recover

Well, the jury says $25,000.

You wanted

You get $25,000, see.

And, so, I considered the evidence at substantial length.
What exactly was the total of the advances made by the general
partners to the limited partners.
know.

I am trying to say I don't

Because various exhibits that came into evidence gave us

different amounts.
know what they were.
office expenses.

$75,000 goes for overhead expenses.

I don't

Maybe they were to pay John Sampson's law

I don't know.

$100,000 goes out to Sampson as attorneys' fees.

Well, I

can't say that he's not entitled to attorneys' fees for all that
he did in this case, and, therefore, I wouldn't say the money was
spent for attorneys' fees or that Sampson took for attorneys'
fees was all wrongfully taken in view of the history of this
thing and, therefore, that's one specific element of damage that
the general partners
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are entitled to recover.
I think if I took the time I could think of other similar
examples-

A factor that I examined closely and brought out in my

findings was Richins' contention with respect to the value of all
the property which—for which he was seeking millions of dollars
in damages, you see.

Yet on his bankruptcy schedules the value

of the properties listed as being properties in which RFC had an
interest fell far below his $9 and $12 million figures that he
set forth in some of his exhibits.

I have no way of knowing what

value of the loss of those properties could be assessed if any.
I guess I will talk more about this when I hear from Mr.
Anderson.

But I concluded that Richins1 conduct was indeed

intentional.

That it was an interference.

I don't mean Richins.

I mean Sampson.

That it was an

interference with an existing economic relationship—several
existing economic relationships.

As I pointed out in seven

months at the end of 1980 he literally controlled all of the
partnerships.

And there is something to be said for his doing

that on the other side of the question, too.
that.

And I recognize

And we'll probably talk about that some more with Mr.

Anderson.
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But the end result is that is the defendants in the case end
up with nothing because of Sampson's conduct.

And I felt that

his conduct justified as a substantial recovery.

And as I said,

I wrestled with my thoughts for hours trying to think of a basis
for fixing a figure, and that's the figure I came up with.
less than what some exhibits claim the advances were.

It's

I think I

pointed out in my findings that the repayment of those advances
had substantial uncertainty if all of the partnerships had been
dissolved and liquidated in an orderly, proper fashion, all
expenses paid and the property sold for the best price they could
collect.
I point out that there still may not have been any money
left to pay all or even part of the advances.

So, I don't think

that the advances gives me necessarily an accurate measure of
damages that I could award to them.

If I had done so it would

be, maybe, $100,000 more than it is.
There were many factors that I weighed and considered and
you see them scattered throughout my findings.
concluded this is a tort.
his conduct.

And, so, I just

Damages was caused by Sampson through

I find it was not such conduct as justified

punitive damages, and will be talking about that, I am sure, but
that the defendants were entitled to a substantial
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recovery-

In no sense of the word could I go to Richins $5

million and $6 million and $9 million and $12 million figures in
arriving at damages because the evidence wasn't there.

Credible

evidence wasn't there that I could accept as being a proper
foundation for a measure of damages.

But I just say that that's

the amount I came up with and I don't think I am obligated to say
that the $250,000 is made up of $250,000 in advances which I
think he would have recovered if they'd have orderly liquidated
all of the partnerships or that it is made up of $100,000
attorneys' fees Sampson took plus the $75,000 that he used for
overhead, plus another $75,000 for some other specific item.
You see, and that's the reason I did what I did, and I don't
think I can really—need to do or can do any different.
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